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Abstract 
This study evaluates a possible alternative view on the literature on managing resource revenue 
for economic growth. Based on recent postulates that resource revenues should be primarily 
used to increase current consumption and capital stock through investments in both public and 
private sectors of the economy, we evaluate the implications of this policy on an economy 
plagued by low capital absorption, dysfunctional public and private institutions and corruption, 
while contrast our findings with the applicability of an alternative proposition. We established, 
using a replica of the Ramsey model and solving for optimal decisions with a Hamiltonian 
function, that the problems of corruption and dysfunctional institutions can potentially stymie any 
form of economic growth in the short term. This in turn crowds out needed investment and can 
deepen the problem of the popular natural resource curse. However, we introduce a form of 
international trade whereby resources are exchanged for needed capital investments as a 
possible alternative to managing resource booms. We established that this alternative will boost 
economic growth even in the presence of corruption and guarantee increased consumption and 
capital stock but only in the short run. 
 
Keywords: Paradox of plenty, Natural resource curse, Corruption, Institutions, International 
Trade and Exchange  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Normatively, one would expect that the occurrence of a resource boom for an economy low in 
capital stock and consumption levels presents a viable opportunity to capture and sustain 
potential economic growth during the time of the resource boom. Historical data and empirical 
studies have shown otherwise (Sachs and Waner 1997; Auty 2001). For developing economies, 
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it is common knowledge that they are rich with hydrocarbons and mineral resources but still 
experience a form of depression in economic growth. This phenomenon has been called the 
“natural resource curse” or “paradox of plenty”. Sole dependence on one primary commodity 
which makes the economy less diversified, the transient and volatile nature of these resource 
revenues, hurtful increases in exchange rates and dysfunctional economic and social 
institutions have been put forward as possible explanations to the predominance of this paradox 
in resource rich countries. 
Over the period 2000-2005, these resources accounted for over 50% of exports and 
contributed over half of total fiscal revenue for African Countries that had experienced a 
resource boom (IMF, 2007). It was estimated that these earnings were further increased due to 
booms during the period of 2006-8 and continued at even higher levels. Yet there has not been 
any significant form of economic growth and development (Collier et al., 2010; Olters, 2007). 
The problem lies in the nature of the resource revenue as well as socio-economic and 
political conditions of the economy.  The revenues from the resource are temporal (mainly due 
to the fact that they are gotten from a depleting stock) and volatile (consistent with commodity 
prices) which make them unreliable for increasing consumption patterns and capital stock.  This 
justifies the need to save and invest the resource revenue in the domestic economy to guard 
against changing consumption patterns that are not desirable (van der Ploeg, 2011). The use of 
resource revenues can serve as a means of financing these growth stimulating investments, but 
there is a need for efficient management of the resources in order to achieve this goal. 
According to van der Ploeg (2008) such investments should be in the form of tangible and 
intangible goods such as; education, infrastructure and capacities that increase government 
effectiveness and economic management.  
Also, the roles of public and private institutions are important factors in determining the 
means of harnessing the resource revenues. The occurrence of a resource boom causes a 
rapid change in revenues and expenditure pattern of the government. Therefore, there will be a 
need for in public and private institutions that guide and monitor these changes to enable them 
perform their duties within the evolving economy. Failure in considering this need may render 
these institutions ineffective and redundant in perform its functions. This ultimately leads to 
corrupt practices, unproductive use of resource revenues and rent seeking. 
Although the literature differs on the supposed effect of a resource boom, they however 
agree that economies with low capital, low incomes and with a dysfunctional institutional 
framework will experience this curse once a resource boom emerges if certain policies are not 
put in place. How then does such a country manage its resource revenue in order to capture all 
economic growth potential and at the same time escape from the natural resource curse? 
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Though different policy measures have been used in answering the question above, for the 
purpose of this study, we are interested in one possible policy that is becoming increasingly 
popular amongst concerned citizens and policy makers in developing countries. We call this 
idea Resource Exchange. It involves the reduction in actual sales of the resource while 
exchanging the resource for needed capital and infrastructure from abroad. The foundation of 
this idea is based on the general consensus that the existence of corruption, as an off shoot of 
abundant resource revenues, will stymie any form of economic growth that can be achieved. 
Hence the need to reduce the amount of resource revenue generated in order to reduce 
corruption effects on growth. At the same time allow for an increased influx of direct investments 
from abroad in the form of capital and economic overhead which will be financed by exchanging 
the resource for these necessities. 
The main objective of this work is to evaluate the proposed policy of a resource 
exchange as an effective means of managing resource booms and resultant revenues to induce 
economic growth in the short run. We present a rigorous contrasting analysis of a possible and 
optimal alternative to the existing literature on managing resource revenues. By introducing 
social problems of corruption and dysfunctional institutions (private and Public) into the 
proposed model and an alternative model, we determine their implications on the level of 
consumption and capital stock. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The emergence of a resource boom in many African countries during the 1960s has not always 
been a blessing to their domestic economies. Various reasons have been put forward by 
researchers as possible explanations that have led to this phenomenon popularly known as the 
“Dutch Disease” or “Paradox of Plenty”. These postulates of the paradox of plenty range from 
economic theoretical reasoning to social and political reasoning.  
In the work of van der Ploeg (2007), various factors were elaborated as the reasons why 
resource rich African countries were plagued by the paradox of plenty. Citing specific 
characteristics of a natural resource windfall such as volatility of natural resource windfalls and 
the temporal nature of the windfall because they are derived from a finite stock of resource, the 
research placed emphasis on an optimal solution for the management of natural resource for 
capital scarce countries. 
The central point about the paradox of plenty is that windfall revenues from the 
exploration of a natural resource increases the real exchange rate for an economy that has low 
capital absorption, and at the same time induce a reduction in traded non-resource sectors of 
the economy, thus making the economy less diversified (Hausmann and Ribogon 2002; Sachs 
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and Waner, 1995). Here emphasis is placed on the exportation of primary commodities and a 
capital intensive manufacturing base. The repercussion of this decision process is to slow down 
the growth process of these economies, van der Ploeg (2007), van der Ploeg and Venables 
(2011), Liete and Weidmann (1999). A blessing has become a curse and growth seems to be 
distant and not achievable if there is a continued use of natural resource to foster economic 
growth.  
Sachs and Warner (1995) was the pioneer study that elaborated the relationship 
between a natural resource boom and economic growth. They were able to show that countries 
that experienced a form of natural resource boom grew slower when controlling for 
macroeconomic policies and income levels. Liete and Weidmann (1999) also supported this 
postulate of a negative relationship between a resource boom and economic growth. Papyarkis 
and Gerlagh (2004) were able to show specifically how resource boom directly and indirectly 
affects the economy, even though a negative effect usually outweighs a positive effect when 
macroeconomic policies like trade openness and investment in human resource were 
considered. 
Humpherys et al., (2007) elaborated the natural resource curse via its volatility. They 
argued that this volatility arises from different extraction costs with the repercussion of sporadic 
public spending, problematic planning and making investment in the country risky. Other 
important possible transmission channels by which the natural resource curse can be explained 
have been highlighted by the literature.  
Hausmann, Rodriguez, and Wagner (2007), emphasised the country’s vulnerability to 
external shocks and possible different productive linkages. They were able to show that 
countries with lower export flexibility find it difficult to recover from any sort of export induced 
economic problems. This explanation is most relevant to economies with natural resource 
contributing more to its total exports. Institutional weakness has been put forward as a possible 
transmission mechanism (Lederman and Maloney, 2008; Wright and Czelusta 2007; Lane and 
Tornell, 1999).  
However, one would expect that a resource boom should induce the desired higher level 
of economic growth. This can be achieved by harnessing the revenues from this boom to serve 
as a boost to the economy via increased investment in economic overhead, public infrastructure 
and human capital (Burnside and Dollar, 2004). Ultimately, a country that experiences a 
resource boom should have higher growth rates (Sachs and Warner, 1999). This line of thinking 
by Sachs and Waner (1999) has been supported by part of the literature, making the theory of 
the paradox of plenty inconclusive. Lederman and Maloney (2007) were able to argue against a 
natural resource curse on GDP and human development using samples from Latin American 
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countries. They emphasised the need to differentiate the effects of a natural resource boom 
from other factors that affect growth. They distinguished between the role played by a resource 
boom in economic growth and its interactions with other determinants of economic growth. 
Introducing intra industry trade and export concentration to their analysis, they found no form of 
a negative relationship between natural resource and Growth in the presence of export 
concentration.  
According to van der Ploeg and Venebles (2011), optimal time paths were gotten from 
welfare maximisation functions in explaining the decision process of managing a natural 
resource windfall. The study contrasted between two possible solutions which were all optimal 
based on specific characteristics of the country involved. For countries that were developed and 
had a high level of income, the Permanent income Hypothesis (PIH) and Bird-in-Hand (BIH) 
encouraged the use of a sovereign wealth Fund (SWF) as optimal solutions. Whereas, for a 
country that had inadequate infrastructure, a low capital-labour ratio, low income, and increasing 
domestic interest rates, should not hold a sovereign wealth Fund (SWF) because this policy has 
an incentive to transfer increases in consumption to future generations. Instead, they advocated 
the use of a policy that had a preference for increasing consumption patterns in current 
generations.  
Numerous investment channels of resource revenues present themselves, but the 
literature is specific about four. According to Collier, et al., (2010) resource revenues can be 
distributed as private consumption through private transfers to citizens or through manipulation 
of the tax system. Also, the resource revenues can be used directly by the government to 
increase public spending either for public consumption or public assets. Thirdly, they can be 
held as a form of government financial asset but lent to the private sector or foreigners. Finally, 
they can be held as foreign reserves by establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) and lent 
to foreigners. We introduce our main idea (Resource Exchange: which entails exchanging a 
fraction of resources for the much needed capital transfer and investment from abroad) of how 
the resource revenue should be managed by contrasting its application with those already 
elaborated in the literature.  
We base our contrast, following the literature (Gupta, et al., 2006; Collier et al., 2010), on 
who gets ownership of the resource, which controls the macro level time path? Who controls 
micro level spending and finally the implications on consumption and investment?  
 
 
 
 
© Onyimadu 
Licensed under Creative Common     Page 234 
 
TABLE 1: Alternative Measures of Managing Resource Revenues 
 Resource 
Availability 
Private 
Consumption 
Government 
Consumption   
Private 
Capital Stock 
Public Capital  
Stock 
Foreign 
Assets 
1.Tax cut 
/Transfer 
1 𝑐 0 1 − c    0 0 
2.Public 
Spending 
1 0 G 0   1 - g 0 
3.Debt 
Reduction 
1 𝑧 0 λ(1 − z)     0 (1-λ)(1-
z) 
4.Resource 
Exchange 
1             γ N2 
 
0 (1-γ)N2 (1-φ) N1 φ N1 
Account 
Identity 
R   -  Cp  -   Cg   =  Ip +  Ig +  If  
Note: c– share of consumption from a tax cut; g – share of consumption in government spending; z – 
share of consumption in private response to government debt reduction/lending; N2- shares of resource 
revenue actually gotten from sales, N1 – share of guaranteed capital stock and investment from resource 
exchange. C=consumption, I=investment, subscripts p-private, g-government-foreign.  
Source: van der Ploeg (2008) and Author 
 
A detailed analysis of the applications of alternatives 1, 2 and 3 can be found in the work of van 
der Ploeg (2008). The table above shows the direct implications of the proposed policy of 
exchanging some of the resource for capital and direct investments in order to escape the 
effects of corruption and induce economic growth. In the resource exchange model, a fraction of 
the resource is sold for revenue N2 and the other fraction N1 is exchanged for capital and 
investment. A fraction of N2,γN2 will be used to increase private consumption through a 
reduction in tax or increased subsidies as well as noting the possibility that these transfers will 
not all be consumed but also used to increase private capital stock by saving (1-γ)N2. The other 
fraction of the available resource that is being used for the exchange, (1- φ) N1, should 
guarantee the increase in public investments through the exchange of (1- φ) N1 of available 
resource for these investments. At the same time avoiding increases in corruption level 
following the assumption that resource revenues breed corruption, while this form increment in 
capital accumulation and investment is devoid of corruption. The idea here is that corruption is 
inherent in an economy that has experienced a resource boom. Capital accumulation and 
domestic investment in the economy are represented by the sum of (1-γ) N2and (1- φ) N1. Part 
of the resource available for exchange φ N1 is also held as foreign assets help guard against 
resource volatility and exchange rates. The paper therefore follow the conclusions of Liete and 
Weidmann (1999), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Isham et al. (2005) that a natural 
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resource revenues breeds corruption which will in turn hurt the economy. In the work of 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009), they concluded that resource abundance will ultimately lead 
to increases in corruption in countries with poor democratic institutions (democratic institutions 
were captured by the ability of people to determine who governs them) but this relationship does 
not hold in countries with better democratic institutions. 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
We follow the pioneering work of van der Ploeg and Venables (2011) and take the conclusions 
of that paper as given as it answers the question of whom to invest the resource revenue on. In 
summary, Van der Ploeg and  Venables(2011) was able to show that the current literature 
postulate of harnessing a windfall either by the theories of Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
or Bird-in-Hand (BIH) are not feasible and practicable in a developing economy that is 
characterised by low capital, low investments and growth rates. Instead, using optimisation 
rules, he was able to show that it will be better for such a country to discard the use of PIH or 
BIH (which place more emphasis is consumption smoothing) and rather invest these resource 
revenues for current consumption. They noted that both theories maintain a permanent 
consumption levels by borrowing before the windfall and offsetting their debts with the revenue 
from the windfall. Hence, both PIH and BIH transfer much of consumption increments due to a 
resource boom to future generations. While this may be optimal for an already developed 
economy, the same cannot be said for a developing economy.  
The paper considers a Hypothetical open economy that can borrow and lend at world 
interest rates. This economy has just experienced a natural resource boom at time T0, and 
intends to use the revenues gotten from this boom for current purposes. As already stated, we 
are assuming that the government implements the idea of van der Ploeg and Venebles (2011) 
and is committed to enhancing current growth prospects by investing for current consumption 
and capital stock. We also assume that the government is the only decision making agent and 
citizens do not own any form of asset but receive some form of transfer from the government. 
The social planner (or Government) is faced with the problem of maximizing its citizen’s utility; 
U≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
  exp (-ρt) dt....... (1) 
 Where C represents private consumption and G represents public consumption. σ is for the 
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution and ρ indicates time preference. µ indicates the weight 
that is given to the portion of government expenditure that goes to public consumption. 
Maximisation of this inter-temporal utility function is subject to the constraints,  
Ќ = F (K, L, G, N)-C-G+N ………………………. (2) 
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With the initial capital stock being K0. Ќ is the rate of increase in capital stock at any date and is 
determined by the variables C, G, N and by a unique production function F (K, L, G, N). N 
stands for the windfall revenue from the natural resource boom and it accrues in totality to 
government. We will assume that the following relationship holds in our production function; 
∂Fk/∂N > 0 and ∂F2k/∂N2< 0, Fk>0 and Fkk< 0 where Fk is the marginal product. We model N in 
such a way that we are assuming that every year there is a particular ceiling quantity of natural 
resource that can be extracted and it is determined by the government. This makes N to be 
endogenous and no need to make an optimal choice about its exploration.  The study uses this 
to abstract from resource depletion cost and placing a constraint on N in such a way that it 
restricts the policy maker from extracting limitless amounts of resources following the efficiency 
conditions of a Ramsey model.  
The optimal conditions rules open to the government are all too familiar. Following a 
basic Ramsey Model and solving using a Hamiltonian function, the efficiency conditions state 
that both consumption types (private and Public) will have to be in fixed proportions i.e. we first 
write a Hamiltonian function given by 
H(C,G,K,N)₌≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
  exp (-ρt) + qt[ F(K,L,G,N) – C – G + N .....(3) 
H represents the Hamiltonian and q stand as the co-state variable .Taking the first derivative 
with respect to C, G and q; we get the following optimal solutions 
HC :C-(1/σ) – qt = 0  ……….. (4) 
HG : µG-(1/σ) - qt = 0  ……… (5) 
Hk: qtFk (K, L, G, N) = - (dq/dt)  ............. (6) 
Where HC, HG and HK represent the first derivatives with respect to C, G and K respectively. The 
transversality condition which holds is 
Lim t→∞ (expρt) qtKt = 0  …… (7) 
It thus follow that G = µσC. The constraints can then be re written as  
Ќ = F (K, L, G, N)-C-G+N = F (K, L, G, N) - C- µσC + N 
Which can be further written as Ќ = F (K, L, G, N) – C (1 + µσ) + N ………. (8) 
 Hence the permanent changes in both variables will depend on the present value of the natural 
resource which we assume to be V0 and Y which is the total output from Non resource products.  
The permanent level of consumption becomes 
C + G= Y+ V0 …………… (9) 
The dynamics of consumption can be explained when take the time derivative of our co state 
variable and substituting the value in our efficiency solutions.  
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We end up with an equation as follows, 
Ċ = UC/UCC [(Fk (K, L, G, N) – ρ] ………… (10) 
Uc = C – (1/σ); is the first derivative of our utility function with respect to consumption and   UCC = 
(-1/σ) C-(1-σ/σ); represents the second derivative of the utility function with respect to 
consumption. For Ċ =0, Fk (K,L,G,N) = ρ. How then does the variable N vary with the steady 
state capital stock? What is dK/dN? As noted earlier, given Fk is increasing in N, it follows that 
an increase in N will make Fk (K, L, G, N) >ρ. Hence to bring them back to equality we have to 
increase K because Fk is falling in K. Therefore dK/dN>0.We further employ the use of a phase 
diagram to show the development path that may arise following our benchmark scenario.  
 
Figure 1:  Consumption and Capital Dynamics without the Influence of Corruption 
 
 
With a natural resource boom, the economy moves from its initial steady state at point A and 
jumps to the new trajectory at point C and move towards its new steady state at point B. 
From figure 1, the Ќ =0, N=0 represents the locus of points that are stationary for capital 
stock when there is no windfall revenue. The line is concave in nature due to the assumptions 
we had earlier made about the production function. For a specific level of capital, Ċ =0 if Fk (K, 
L, G, N) =ρ. If this level of capital stock is called K1, then Ċ>0 when Fk(K,L,G,N) >ρ at which the 
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level of capital K2<K1, where K2 is the level of capital that persists when Fk(K,L,G,N) > ρ. 
Alternatively, for a specific level of consumption,  =0 when C = F (K,L,G,N) + N. Here, the value 
of C is increasing until the point where Fk (K, L, G, N) = N after then it decreases. Whenever C 
exceeds the value that makes Ќ =0, K will fall; whenever C is lower than this value, K will rise. 
Without the leisure of a natural resource windfall, the economy is at a steady state level at point 
A, determined by the intersection of the Ќ= 0 and Ċ = 0 lines. At this point the corresponding 
levels of consumption and Capital are C’ and K’ respectively. It becomes noteworthy that we are 
currently assuming that these levels of consumption and Capital are very low and domestic 
interest rates being higher than world interest rates signifying a developing economy. At its 
current point on the saddle path, it can easily gain from higher returns on possible investments 
and capital increments. Hence the Growth path of this economy is defined by the line ss and 
this will remain the economic growth trajectory. We are basing our analysis of economic growth 
based on the increment of consumption/savings, Investment as well as increasing capital stock. 
Following the Neoclassical theory, emphasis for growth had been placed on capital 
accumulation and savings (Caselli and Ventura, 2000). Even though promoting the 
accumulation of capital my not serve as an optimal solution for long run purposes due to 
diminishing returns setting in and choking off growth, in the short run, it will serve as the much 
needed boost that a capital scarce economy may need in order to harness potential high return 
investments and  economic growth.  
In order to keep Ќ = 0 line constant, when there is a natural resource boom, there will 
have to be a corresponding proportional change in the level of consumption. That is, for Ќ = 0, 
then C= Fk (K, L, G, N) + N. Thus for an increase in N, C must also increase to keep Ќ =0. Also 
from the model, we are assuming that the revenue from the natural resource boom will have 
some positive effects on the production process. Our idea is that, these resource revenues can 
serve as a boost to the domestic productive process especially in both traded and non-traded 
sectors of the economy given a high rate of return on investment ( due to capital scarcity, high 
interest rate characterised by developing economies). Therefore, it follows that, with the 
occurrence of a surprising natural resource boom in the short run, the revenue from the 
resource can be used to increase current consumption and capital stock and investment given 
their already low level. It is the presence of profitable investments (we refer to investments in 
public goods e.g. education, health, infrastructure and institutions that induce good government 
and economic management) that ultimately puts the economy on a higher level of consumption, 
income and higher economic growth. Point B represents the new steady state point of the 
economy after it has experienced a resource boom. The economy will jump from its old steady 
state (point A) to the new trajectory (at point C) and continue until it gets to the new steady state 
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at point B, i.e. a jump from line ss to line s׳s׳. The economy will move from point A to point B 
with evidence of an increased level of consumption and Capital stock due to increased domestic 
investment via resource revenues which are optimal following the literature by van der Ploeg 
and Venables (2009). 
Our bench mark has been able to show the implication of a natural resource boom on 
consumption and capital stock. According to van der Ploeg and Venables (2011), the revenue 
from the resource boom should induce the accumulation of these necessary factors of economic 
growth for countries that have experienced this windfall if they invest in the public sector. Having 
concurred with the postulate through our bench mark, we want to evaluate the impact of this 
policy when we introduce corruption into the model. Does dedicating resource revenue to public 
infrastructure in order to increase current consumption and capital still remain optimal? If it does 
not, then what is the possible alternative for an economy that has experienced a resource boom 
but plagued by corruption. 
 
EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON BENCH MARK 
We introduce corruption into our bench mark analysis through the transmission channel of a 
natural resource boom. Considering that natural resource boom breeds corruption (Isham, et al., 
2005), we postulate that the effect of this form of corruption is reflected as misappropriation of 
resource revenue. Instead of using these windfall revenues for capital accumulation and 
investment, rent seeking individual covert it for private and unproductive endeavors. This implies 
that corruption inherently reduces the amount of resource revenue that can be used to 
encourage growth. Given N as the resource revenue without the influence of corruption and Ň is 
resource revenue with corruption, N>Ň and N – Ň = Φ which represents the amount of resource 
revenue misappropriated due to corruption. As corruption increases the value of Φ also 
increases in value and this reduces the resource revenue available for economic decision and 
growth. 
If we further assume that a fraction of the available resource revenue in the presence of 
corruption, Ň is used for productive purposes i.e. ωŇ where 0 < ω < 1 and the other fraction (1 – 
ω) Ň is used to facilitate other government decision processes. Our initial Ќ dynamics becomes; 
Ќ = F (K, L, G, ωŇ – С – G + (1- ω) Ň  …………… (11) 
 
The social planner will thus be faced with the problem of maximizing; 
U ≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
exp (-ρt) dt 
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The Hamiltonian for this social planner’s problem with the introduction of corruption becomes; 
H(C,G,K,(1-ω) Ň) ≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
 exp (-ρt)dt + qt[ F(K,L,G,ωŇ)–C-G –(1 – ω) Ň] ...(12) 
Solving this Hamiltonian function following the same efficiency conditions as our bench mark, 
we arrive at the following results; 
HC: C-(1/σ) – q = 0 
HG: µG-(1/σ) - q = 0 
HK: qtFK (K, L, G, ωŇ) = - (dq/dt) 
The transversality condition that prevails is Lim t→∞ (eρt) qtKt = 0 and the rate of change in capital 
stock can be written as  
Ќ = А (F(K,L,G, ωŇ) – С(1 + µσ) + (1-ω) Ň ………(13) 
The dynamics of consumption can be derived by following the normal Ramsey model where  
Ċ = UC/UCC [(Fk (K, L, G, ωN) – ρ]     ……………… (14) 
As explained earlier the dynamics of both Consumption and capital stock still remains the same. 
We use the phase diagram below to explain their co movements. We compare the movement of 
the economy in the graph below for both our bench mark model and the economy with the 
persistence of corruption. 
 
Figure 2: Consumption and Capital Dynamics with the Effect of Corruption 
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At its initial steady state (point A), the economy moves to a higher trajectory (point C) with the 
occurrence of resource boom and will end up at a higher steady state. With corruption, the initial 
jump in consumption, will not be as high as without corruption (Point C > point D) and ultimately 
a lower steady state, which may be temporal if corruption increases.  
Starting from an initial steady state without the natural resource boom at point A, the 
prevailing level of consumption and capital stock in the economy is C’and K’ respectively. The 
economy will continue to remain at line ss saddle path. With the emergence of a resource boom 
and the government’s decision to use its increasing source of revenue to further invest on 
current consumption and capital (following the postulate of van der Ploeg and Venables (2009), 
there will be an expansion of both capital stock (from K’ to K* where K*> K׳) and the level of 
consumption (from C’ to C*, where C*> C’). This represents our bench mark via the saddle path 
line S̕S̕. As the Natural resource revenue continues to flow in, the level of corrupt practices 
begin to rise. The assumption here is that in our hypothetical economy, there are dysfunctional 
government institutions, prevalence of low capital, low incomes and macroeconomic instability, 
which encourages corrupt practices especially with a resource boom. The effect of which 
reduces revenue amount that can be potentially spent on accumulation of capital and 
Production. 
The negative effect of corruption thus makes the Ќ = 0 line to increase, but not as much 
as it would have if there were no corrupt practices. The locus of points Ќ =0, Ň>0 is the new 
production function where only a fraction of the available resource revenue ωŇ will have a 
positive effect of increasing the production process. As long as Ň>0 and remains that way, there 
will always be an increase in the consumption level (from C'to C**, where C*>C**> C') and 
capital stock (from K' to K** where K*> K** > K’). However, this still remains sub optimal given 
the potential loss in both current consumption (C* - C**) and current capital stock (K* - K**). It 
becomes obvious that corruption erodes part of the growth potential of the economy. We 
present graphically the change in Natural resource revenue (A), consumption levels (B) and 
capital stock (C) below. 
 
Figure 3: Changes in Consumption, Capital and Natural Resource with Corruption 
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Figure (A) shows the occurrence of a resource boom and potential loss in resource revenue from corruption. 
Figure (B) shows the changes in consumption and the potential loss with increasing corruption.  
Figure(C) shows changes in capital stock and also the potential loss with increasing corruption. 
Source: Author 
 
From the diagram above, a natural resource windfall is experienced at time T0. From our capital 
stock and consumption dynamics, this has the implication of increasing consumption 
(consumption jumps from C’ to C*) and capital (capital gradually increases with time from K’ to 
K*) to capture current economic growth potentials as postulated by Vander ploeg (2011). 
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However, with the increasing source of revenue to the government and the existence of 
economic problems like low capital, low income and dysfunctional institutions , the increase in 
consumption level (a jump in consumption from C to C**) and Capital (a gradual Increase in 
capital from K to K**)will not be as much as it will have been without corruption. The loss in both 
consumption and Capital stock is further worsened if the resource boom is not temporal.  
This has the potential of eroding any meaning full form of increased consumption and 
capital stock. This can be seen in graphs A, B and C. As the resource revenues increase over 
time, the level of corruption also increases which in turn reduces resource revenues available 
for productive endeavors (downward shift in the Blue line in Graph A), reduction in consumption 
levels (a downward shifts in blue line in graph B) and loss of capital stock (a downward shift in 
blue line in graph C) due to depreciation, lack of maintenance culture, non-accountability, non-
existing innovation and research etc. The level of corruption can be so high that it stymies 
increases in consumption and capital stock, thereby returning the economy back to its former 
steady state without the existence of a resource boom. Therefore applying the idea of Van der 
Ploeg (2011), however optimal, can still encourage the emergence of a resource curse in 
countries that have poor institutions which breed corruption. 
 
RESOURCE EXCHANGE IN THE MODEL 
The Problem of using revenue from a resource boom to increase the current level of 
consumption and capital stock for an economy that needs to develop is founded on a 
relationship between resource revenue booms and corruption. Even though we still maintain 
that our benchmark remains optimal, the presence of corruption falters the process. Hence the 
need for a responsible government to apply the idea of van der Ploeg and Venables (2011) in 
such a way that the desired result of increasing consumption and capital can still be achieved 
with the aid of a resource boom and the presence of increasing corrupt practices. 
The idea of a resource exchange may be a possible solution. As earlier stated, the 
proposed theory is to shelve the sales of the resource (not in totality) and rather enter into some 
form of international transfer between the country experiencing the boom and countries willing 
to buy the resource. In this form of international trade, the country experiencing the resource 
boom will only exchange its resource for needed capital stock and investments.  This model 
presents the following advantages; 
 It reduces the amount of resource revenues available for misappropriation and corrupt 
practices 
 It guarantees consumption, capital and investment increases in the short run 
 Reduces dependency on one product 
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Assumptions 
 This is an open economy that has experienced a resource boom over a period of time but 
has not yet experienced significant economic growth 
 Low consumption and capital stock levels 
 There is a possibility of citizens having assets  
 We are also place restrictions on the kind of capital goods that are exchanged. We 
emphasise that these goods cannot be resold and will only be used for what they were 
originally intended for. 
 We assume that it is possible to exchange the resource for capital in a 1 for 1 manner where 
the terms of trade between each country is negotiated and agreed upon 
 We assume a low transaction cost associated with the trade. 
 We still hold our restriction on natural resource depletion. 
 
The social planner’s problem will thus be to maximize; 
U ≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
e(-ρt) dt 
Subject to: Ќ = F (K1, K2, L, G, ωN2)-C-G+N1+ (1-ω) N2 …………. (15). 
K1 represents the pre-existing level of capital stock before the resource boom (which we are 
assuming to be very low in our hypothetical economy) and K2 represents the capital stock and 
foreign investment due to the exchange of a resource boom. The total available capital will thus 
be K1+K2.  We assume that the country derives N as its returns from the resource boom which is 
made up of; N2 being the revenue gotten from sales of the resource and N1 gotten from the 
exchange of the resource for different types of economic overhead e.g. capital, manpower, 
education, technology etc. which cannot be resold or coveted by individuals. We also assume 
that corruption through misappropriation of resource revenues can only increase if N2 increases, 
i.e. if the government remains dedicated to selling the resource for revenue. Thus optimally, in 
the short run the Government should commit itself to acquiring more of N1 than N2, limiting 
corruption but still increasing consumption and capital stock. Where d FK2 (K1,K2,L,G,N) / d N1> 
0   if N1> N2, if N2 ≥ N1 and given that increases in corruption follow increases in N2, the net 
effect is the possibility of the production function not shifting of possibly shifting downwards in 
order to keep Ќ = 0 
Using the Hamiltonian function; 
H(K2,C,G,N1)≡ ∫
𝐶
1−(
1
𝜎
)
+µ𝐺
1−(
1
𝜎
)
1−(
1
𝜎
)
∞
0
 e(-ρt) + qt[F(K1,K2,L,G,ωN1)- C-G+N1+(1-ω)N2......(16) 
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We derive the consumption dynamics. We are skipping the efficiency conditions here because 
they are similar to our bench mark in derivations. The only difference is that for the optimal rule 
for capital, we will be optimizing for both forms of capital K1 and K2 in such a way that we will 
use the total sum of both forms of capital as a measure of capital in the economy. 
Ċ = UC/UCC [FK2+K1 (K1, K2, L, G, ωN2) – ρ] …………….. (17) 
 
With FK2+K1 = Total Marginal product of all the capital available for production. And the 
transversality condition that Lim t→∞ (eρt) q (K2t + K1t) = 0. Optimal decisions will be similar to our 
bench mark but the economies movement to its steady state will be determined by different 
optimal decisions. As the government enters into bargaining and exchange, it accumulates 
more of N1 type of foreign investments and capital stock. This inevitable increases the amount 
of K2 available for production. The amount of K2 depends on the amount of N2 that the 
government is willing to accept form exchange of the resource thereby limiting rapid changes in 
its actual revenues and discouraging corruption.  In other to keep Ќ = 0, it follows that C= F (K1, 
K2, L, G, ωN2)+ N1+ (1-ω) N2. If the governments stick to using its resource revenues to 
increase capital and consumption, as N2> 0 over time, (1-ω) N2 increases and ωN2 will have a 
positive impact on the production function. This is not a stable steady state because of the 
inevitable increases in corruption level which will erode current consumption over time. For Ċ= 
0, FK2+K1 (K1, K2, L, G, ωN) = ρ. With a policy of using resource revenues, changes in the 
marginal product of capital due to changes in ωN2 cannot be sustainable also. This is because 
of the negative impact of corruption on resource revenues and the fact that capital is already 
low. Hence the total marginal product becomes smaller and smaller over time making    FK2+K1   
(K1, K2, L, G, ωN) < ρ. To make Ċ= 0, there will be a reduction in capital stock bringing the 
economy back to a lower level of capital stock. 
However, because there is no assumed relationship between N1 and corruption and with 
restrictions placed on the type  and use of K2, increasing use of exchanging the resource for K2 
type capital stock will push the economy to the bench mark trajectory ss. There will be a jump in 
consumption from Point C’ to point C* and also for capital stock from K’ to K*. The government 
thus has the choice of policy whereby it can follow our alternative optimal solution (exchanging 
resource for capital goods) in the very short term, until it has increased current consumption and 
capital stock the necessary institutions have also evolved and the economy is on a higher 
growth path. Then in the mid-long term it can switch to our benchmark policy (using resource 
revenues), where it will be able to tackle the issue of corruption, economic growth and 
development due to better public and private institutions already evolved. 
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CONCLUSION 
Managing resource booms and the resultant rapid changes in revenue has always been a 
challenge to policy makers and governments. The need to diversify the economy, maintain 
stability of prices and exchange rates as well as nurture the needed changes in public and 
private institutions are part of the problems of a resource boom, which if treated without caution, 
may lead to the popular natural resource curse. Even with contrasting evidence on the effect of 
a resource boom on economic growth, recent literature leans towards the idea of investing 
resource revenues for current generations in order to increase consumption and capital stock 
van der Ploeg and Venebles (2011). 
We have been able to show that the resource exchange model can serve as a possible 
investment channel for developing countries, in particular, African countries that are resource 
rich. This model is far from conclusive in its postulate as well as its practicability. We did not 
include political problems and resource ownership conflicts that are associated with a resource 
boom. Also, we did not consider the effects of resource depletion and its associated cost in the 
model.  We only looked at corruption from the point of resource revenue generation and 
expenditure, without taking into consideration other aspects from which corrupt practices occur. 
Despite our limitations, the resource exchange model still presents a viable opportunity for a 
responsible government to induce economic growth for its respectable economies. We conclude 
with a need to further study this idea and its general implications for a developing economy. 
Further research into this idea should focus on the practicability – the effects on terms of trade; 
implications on exchange rates, capital absorption, and political economic issues; and public 
sector practices – of the resource exchange model. For now, it remains a plausible opportunity 
for managing resource booms. 
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